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Introduction
Many mistakes have been made and many inadequacies must be confessed.
But I am consoled by the fact that in proceedings of this novelty, errors and
missteps may also be instructive to the future.
1
-Robert H. Jackson
On December 10, 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council established the

Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), a unique judicial body created to prosecute
t Michael P. Scharf is Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox
International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He
previously served as Attorney Adviser for United Nations Affairs at the U.S. Department
of State, where he played a leading role in the creation of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Professor Scharf and his students at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law are part of the Iraqi Special Tribunal's Research
Consortium, and this article had its genesis as a research memorandum prepared by
Professor Scharf and Ahran Kang (J.D., May 2005) at the request of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal Prosecutor in 2004.
1. Report to the President on the Nuremberg Tribunal, October 7, 1946, quoted in
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR

CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG
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Saddam Hussein and other former Iraqi leaders for war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression. 2 Shortly thereafter, I (first person references are to Michael Scharf) wrote that the IST
would suffer from the misperception of being a "puppet court of the occupying power" since its statute had been drafted during the occupation by
the United States, its funding was coming from the United States, its judges
were selected by a U.S.-appointed provisional government, and the judges
3
and prosecutors were to be assisted by U.S. advisors.
Subsequently, I was invited to be one of a handful of international
experts selected by the U.S. Department of Justice Regime Crimes Liaison
Office to advise the IST judges and prosecutors in the law and the procedure applicable to war crimes trials. Despite my initial misgivings about
the IST, I thought it would be better to participate in the process of improving the Tribunal than to remain on the sideline, hurling criticisms at it.
During the next several months, I traveled many times to the United Kingdom, where I led a series of training sessions for the IST judges and the IST
prosecutors that culminated in a mock trial. What I learned from this
experience convinced me that I had been largely wrong about the Iraqi
Special Tribunal. 4 As an introduction to this article, it seems appropriate
to begin by describing the four revelations that altered my view about the
IST.
First, I learned that Iraqis had played a much greater role in drafting
the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal ("IST Statute") than had been
reported in the press. Exhibit A would be the fact that the Iraqis had
insisted, over initial U.S. objections, on the inclusion of a provision in the
IST Statute (Article 14) that would enable the IST to prosecute Hussein for
the crime of aggression, in addition to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. This is paramount because no one has been charged
with the crime of aggression since Nuremberg in 1945. 5 The United States,
which itself has been accused of waging aggressive wars, had successfully
blocked its inclusion in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). 6 But the Iraqis, who viewed the
unprovoked attacks by Hussein against Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990 as
tragic follies, would not back down to U.S. pressure. Thus, the inclusion of
the crime of aggression was the first signal that the IST would be an Iraqiled, rather than American-controlled project.
Second, I became convinced that the IST judges would not be under
the influence of the United States since the United States did not have any
2. See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. l(b), Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231,
available at http://iraq-ist.org/en/about/statute.htm [hereinafter IST Statute].
3. Michael P. Scharf, Is It InternationalEnough? A Critiqueof the Iraqi Special Tribunal in Light of the Goals of InternationalJustice, 2 J. OF INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 330, 331 (2004).
4. See Michael P. Scharf, Can this Man Get a Fair Trial?,WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2004,
at B1-B2.
5. Id. at B2.
6. Id.
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direct control over the selection process. The IST judges were selected by
the Iraqi provisional government with the assistance of the Iraqi Bar Association, an association of 21,000 lawyers throughout Iraq. During the
regime of Hussein, Iraq was a surprisingly litigious society with a thriving
legal system presided over by 1,000 judges. From those judges, 150 were
excluded from consideration as potential IST judges because they had been
affiliated with Hussein's special security courts or were active members of
the Ba'ath party. Similarly, a number of jurists in exile were excluded from
consideration because they were perceived as potentially being biased
against the members of the former regime. Consequently, the Iraqi provisional government could ultimately select its IST judges from a pool of 750
judges. 7 Thus, the persons selected to be IST judges were an experienced
and impartial group of jurists.
In addition, I came away with a good sense of the general character of
the IST judges from the training sessions. They are an incredibly committed and brave group, who agreed to risk their lives by accepting their commission. Most impressive in this regard is Raed Johui al-Saadi, the thirtyfive year-old Chief Investigating Judge who presided over the initial appearance of Hussein before the IST on July 1, 2004. As a result of extensive
media coverage of that event, Judge Raed has become perhaps as recognizable a figure in Iraq as Hussein. Judge Raed told me that he was given the
option to hide his face from the cameras during the proceedings, but he
declined to do so because he did not want the IST to be subject to the same
criticism that has been levied against hooded judges in Peru and Chile. He
was willing to put his personal safety at risk as the price to show the face of
Iraqi justice and the IST's commitment to fairness. Consequently, his
example will be followed by the other IST judges during the oncoming trials. Furthermore, the IST judges indicated that they will acquit defendants
if the prosecution does not meet its burden and prove its case. Citing the
example of Nuremberg, where three of the twenty-two Nazi defendants
were found not guilty, several of the IST judges remarked that they felt that
appropriate acquittals in the IST trials would confirm the fairness and
impartiality of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. This kind of commitment to fairness will bode well for the IST process.
However, for this special tribunal to be viewed as a truly legitimate
court, it must be independent not only of the United States but also of the
Iraqi executive and legislative branches, as well as the ordinary Iraqi court
system. 8 The IST will attempt to accomplish this goal through various measures such as prohibiting prosecutors from seeking or receiving "instruc7. Although the selected IST judges only have experience in cases involving nonpolitical murder, assault, theft, torts, property and contract disputes, and family law
matters and not war crimes or crimes against humanity, this was also the situation with
judges serving on the international war crimes tribunals in The Hague, Arusha, and
Freetown. Those distinguished international jurists, like IST judges, had to undergo
training in this highly specialized field of law before they were ready to preside over war
crimes cases.
8. See IST Statute, supra note 2, art. 1(a).
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tions from any Governmental Department or any source." 9 However, the
strongest evidence of the IST's independence will come from the IST judges
themselves. For example, during the January 30, 2005 elections in Iraq,
interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi repeatedly promised that the trial
of Hussein and Chemical Ali would begin imminently, a statement that
elicited cheers at every campaign stop. But, the IST judges resisted this
pressure to rush the trials, making it clear that trials of this magnitude
could not begin for many months, at least not until the judges had been
fully trained, the investigating judges and prosecutors had completed their
investigations, and the defense counsel had been given adequate time to
prepare their case.
Third, I learned that the Department of Justice's Regime Crimes Liaison Office in Baghdad (RCLO), which was established to assist the IST in
training its judges, drafting the IST Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("IST
Rules"), and preparing case files for prosecution, would not be the puppet
master of the IST. The RCLO is made up of a half-dozen assistant U.S.
attorneys and judge advocate general (JAG) officers from across the United
States who have volunteered for temporary assignment to Baghdad. The
Director of RCLO, Greg Kehoe, noted that this office had been given an
extraordinary amount of autonomy from Washington, D.C., which had
decided to remain at arm's-length in order to counter the appearance of
undue influence over the IST. Moreover, the RCLO had decided to partner
with the internationally respected International Bar Association and other
NGOs, which would take the lead in conducting training sessions for the
IST judges and IST prosecutors. In contrast to what I initially understood,
the RCLO staff will not themselves be filling the advisor slots identified in
the IST Statute. Instead, those positions will go to independent experts
from around the world selected with the help of the International Bar
Association.
Fourth, I became familiar with the IST Statute and Rules, which were
designed to fully comply with international human rights standards.
Much has been made in the press of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's
opposition to the IST. These articles have cited Mr. Annan's concerns
about the fairness of the IST procedures and his opposition to the death
penalty and these articles have reported his forbiddance of ICTY judges
from participating in the IST training sessions. The evidence suggests,
however, that Mr. Annan's actions were more a reflection of his desire to
make a statement opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq than any material substantive and procedural concerns about IST and its due process. The IST
Rules, which detail the due process rights of the defendant, were still in the
development stage when Mr. Annan voiced his opinion against the IST.
Hence, it was ostensibly premature of Mr. Annan to declare that the IST
procedures were inconsistent with international norms and standards. The
recently released IST Rules 10 address the major concerns voiced by critics
9. Id. art. 8(b).
10. Revised Version of Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, available at http://www.iraqispecialtribunal.org/en/laws/rules.htm [hereinafter 1ST Rules].
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of the IST, especially the potential use of so-called torture evidence against
the defendants. In fact, the IST Rules contain a sweeping exclusionary
rule, which requires the IST to deem inadmissible any evidence that was
not given voluntarily or that was obtained by means that cast substantial
doubt on its reliability and veracity." Indeed, the IST Rules afford more
protection of the rights of the defendant than U.S. law does by providing
that all interrogations, following a waiver of the right to remain silent, must
12
be video-taped in order to ensure that no coercive tactics were employed.
As for the issue of the death penalty, I learned after discussing the
matter with the IST judges that it was not something that the United States
had insisted on, but was something that the Iraqi people strongly felt was a
necessary option, at least with respect to defendants who were convicted of
genocide, the worst crime known to humankind. In fact, the United States
had warned the Iraqis that the insistence on the death penalty would make
it difficult to obtain cooperation from the United Nations and European
states, which have long opposed this practice. 1 3 But Iraq has always had
the death penalty, going back to the Code of Hammurabi (1750 BC), history's earliest comprehensive legal text. 14 Moreover, citing the Napoleonic
precedent, the Iraqis were extremely concerned that without the death penalty, convicted leaders could one day return to power, as Hussein had done
after being released from prison in 1968.15
Thus, I became convinced that the IST is designed to be fairer and
more independent than it had been generally acknowledged and perceived
in the press. While it is not a true international tribunal as many of its
critics would have preferred, the IST can be characterized as an "internationalized domestic tribunal." It has jurisdiction over international
offenses, and its statute provides that the IST should "resort to the relevant
decisions of international courts or tribunals as persuasive authority" in
interpreting those crimes. 16 Its recently promulgation of the Rules of Procedure, which supplement the existing Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure,
are modeled upon those rules and procedures used by the modern international war crimes tribunals. In addition, while no international judges
have been appointed to its bench, its statute and its rules require that international experts be assigned to advise and to assist investigative judges,
trial judges, appeals chamber judges, the Prosecutions Department, and
11. Since the IST does not employ a jury, it will follow the civil law model of enforcing the exclusionary rule by requiring that the written judgment of the tribunal may not
in any way refer to evidence deemed inadmissible. See Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes
Abroad, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 375, 393-94 (2001).
12. See IST Rules, supra note 10, R. 46(1)(iii).
13. See Press Release, National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, World Coalition Against the Death Penalty Statement (July 1, 2004), http://www.ncadp.org/pressrelease_7_1_2004_wcadp.html.
14. Claude Hermann & Walter Johns, Babylonian Law: The Code of Hammurabi, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (1 lth ed. 1910-11), availableat http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/hamcode.html#horne.
15. See Tiscali.reference, Saddam Hussein, http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0025716.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
16. IST Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(b).
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the Defense Office. 17 As an internationalized court, dealing with international crimes and high level offenders, the IST can learn much from the
successes and failures of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL. This article
will examine the key lessons from these three currently active ad hoc tribunals, which will assist the IST in successfully carrying out its mandate.
I.

Key Lessons from the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL

A.

Gaining Credibility in the Community: The Importance of
Launching an Effective Outreach Program

The Statute calls for the hiring of a "public relations expert" to give
"regular briefings to the press and the public at large with respect to the
developments relating to the Tribunal."'1 8 One of the reasons for prosecuting Hussein and his associates is to bring justice and reconciliation to Iraq
for the horrors its people had to endure under his rule. However, in order
to effectively achieve this goal, in addition to hiring a public relations
expert, the IST must also develop an ambitious and comprehensive outreach program that will inform the Iraqis of "the IST's plans, including the
proposed timeframe for its activity, and what the IST intends to achieve
within it."' 19 If the IST does not fully inform the Iraqi people of its mandate
and its process, the IST may fail to be "seen as a credible contributor to
justice and stability." 20 Hence, it is important for the IST to explain to the
Iraqis the nature of the indictments the IST issues and to proceed throughout the trials in an open and transparent manner. 2 1 The ICTY, ICTR, and
SCSL have all implemented outreach programs with varying results.
The ICTY's Outreach Programme mandate was to "bridge the divide
separating the [ICTY] in The Hague from the communities it serves in the
22
states and territories that have emerged from [the] former Yugoslavia."
However, in spite of its mandate, many observers have regarded the ICTY
as having failed at developing and implementing an effective outreach program. Instead of focusing on the people in the region about whom the
ICTY should have been concerned, the ICTY reached out primarily to its
international donors and diplomatic supporters, resulting in widespread
misunderstanding and lack of credibility from the people living in the
region formerly known as Yugoslavia. 23 For example, in 2003, Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald, a former judge and President of the ICTY, complained
that notwithstanding the 301-page judgment against the first defendant
17.
18.

IST Rules, supra note 10, R. 39.
IST Statute, supra note 2, art. 9(e).

19. U.S.

INSTITUTE OF PEACE, BUILDING THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL: LESSONS FROM

EXPERIENCES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

3 (2004), available at http://www.usip.

org/pubs/specialreport/srl22.pdf [hereinafter BUILDING THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL].

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY Outreach Programme: Introduction, http://www.un.org/icty/bhs/outreach/outreach-info.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter ICTY Outreach Programme].
23. See BUILDING THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 19, at 3.
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before the ICTY, which included "a detailed description of the horrors of
the Omarska and Keraterm camps, many [people] in the region still
believed [that these stories came from] 'collection centers,' temporarily
housing [individuals] who desired to leave the Prijedor area" 24 and thus
were biased and unreliable. To this day, the ICTY outreach program is still
funded by voluntary contributions from outsiders instead of the ICTY
25

itself.

Similar to the experience of the ICTY, observers of the ICTR also
believe that it has largely failed to reach out to the Rwandans and educate
them about the ICTR and its purpose. In fact, the Rwandan government is
one of the most outspoken critics of the ICTR and its negative view of the
ICTR is reflected in the Rwandan popular public opinion. 26 Despite eight
years of trials of individuals accused of being involved in the Rwandan
genocide and other crimes by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the majority of
Rwandans' knowledge and understanding of the ICTR and its operations
remains "extraordinarily low."' 2 7 In fact, a survey conducted in February

2002 revealed that only 0.7% of respondents believed that they were "well
informed" of the ICTR's operations and only 10% of respondents believed
that they were "informed" about the work of the ICTR. 28 In contrast, 55%
of those surveyed claimed to be "not well informed" and 31.3% of respondents stated that they were "not at all informed." 2 9 In addition, a majority
of Rwandans feel that the ICTR is "a useless institution, an expedient
mechanism for the international community to absolve itself of its responsibilities for the genocide and its tolerance of the crimes of the [Rwandan
30
Patriotic Front]."
The SCSL, learning from the poor records and experiences of the
ICTY and ICTR, placed a stronger emphasis on community outreach from
the court's inception. The SCSL's outreach program is widely considered
to have played a large role in garnering credibility among the local population. 3 1 The SCSL has conducted its outreach program through "town hall
forums around the country, ongoing communications through local media,
and regular meetings and consultations with a broad range of civil society
24. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (Nov. 6, 2003), in INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES: MAKING A DIFFERENCE?: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY

OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW 18-19 (Steven R. Ratner &James L. Bischoff eds., University of
Texas at Austin School of Law 2004).
25. ICTY Outreach Programme, supra note 22.
26. Timothy Longman, The Domestic Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal

for Rwanda, (Nov. 6, 2003), in INTERNATIONAL

WAR CRIMES: MAKING A DIFFERENCE?: PRO-

CEEDINGS OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF

36 (Steven R. Ratner & James L. Bischoff eds., University of Texas at Austin School
of Law 2004).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Kathy Marks, The Rwanda Tribunal:Justice Delayed, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, June
7, 2001, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2001/0607icg.htm.
LAW

31.

BUILDING THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL,

supra note 19, at 3.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 38

representatives." 3 2 The outreach section of the SCSL has also included the
involvement of the Chief Prosecutor, David Crane, who for four months
traveled the Sierra Leone countryside and visited every district and every
major town.3 3 Mr. Crane felt it was important to meet the people of Sierra
34
Leone and hear firsthand accounts of their tragedies.
In addition to town hall meetings, consultations, and communications
through local media, the SCSL's outreach program created The Special
Court Made Simple, a booklet aimed at making the SCSL's "mission and
procedures more accessible to Sierra Leoneans, especially those at the village level." 35 This booklet explains key concepts relating to the SCSL in
simple language and is accompanied by illustrations that communicate the
written words. In addition, the booklet includes sections describing each
step of the investigative and trial processes and it has sections such as
"Who will the Special Court Try?", "Why was the Special Court for Sierra
' 36
Leone Created?", and "How Does the Special Court Work?
Hence, like the SCSL, which learned from the mistakes of the ICTY
and ICTR, the IST should follow the example of the SCSL and make it a
high priority to develop and implement an ambitious outreach program. It
is important to inform the Iraqi public of how the IST works and why it
was created. As illustrated by the ICTY and the ICTR, if the IST fails to
develop an effective outreach program, it risks being dismissed by an indifferent or uninformed Iraqi public as an insignificant and useless court.
Although the current security situation may preclude launching some
aspects of an outreach program in the near future, the IST should start
planning an outreach program and implement initiatives such as publication of a booklet modeled after the SCSL as soon as possible. As the security situation improves, the IST can then take other steps to inform the Iraqi
public of its mandate and mission. The IST should do its utmost to ensure
that the Iraqis see that the IST is fair in the administration of justice and
that the IST is not a kangaroo or puppet court.
B. The Importance of Building an Initial Prosecutorial Strategy
Unlike the ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL, the IST Statute does not impose
any limits on the number of defendants or types of crimes that it may prosecute. But due to limited resources, facilities, and judges, and as a practical
matter, the IST should prosecute only defendants accused of serious
crimes under the jurisdiction of the IST. The ICTY and ICTR made the
mistake of indicting hundreds of individuals, and then having to drop
charges, enter into plea bargains, or refer cases back to local courts as the
32. Id.
33. David M. Crane, Dancingwith the Devil: ProsecutingWest Africa's Warlords: Building Initial ProsecutorialStrategy for an International Tribunal After Third World Armed
Conflicts. 37 CASE W. RES. 3. INT'L. 1, 6 (2005).
34. See id.
35.

OUTREACH SECTION, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, THE SPECIAL COURT MADE

(2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/specialcourtmadesimple.pdf.
36. Id.

SIMPLE
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tribunals' workload expanded beyond their capacity. In contrast, shortly
after his appointment, the prosecutor of the SCSL mapped out a carefully
tailored and successful prosecutorial strategy, which may serve as a good
37
model for the IST.

The SCSL prosecutor planned his strategy within the context of the
SCSL's mandate to "prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility
for the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law
and crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law."38 The operative words
in the SCSL's mandate are "greatest responsibility." 39 The inclusion of
these words means that the court would only prosecute and hold accountable the warlords who were responsible for the murder, rape, maiming, and
mutilation of over 500,000 people. 40 Focusing on those defendants with
the greatest responsibility would allow the SCSL to be efficient and effective in dispensing justice by staying within its budgetary
and time con4
straints while simultaneously fulfilling its mandate. '
The SCSL prosecutor's strategy also included timed-phases from
predeployment to trial.4 2 Moreover, the SCSL prosecutor also time-phased
the Office of the Prosecutor's movement into Sierra Leone. 4 3 The Office of
the Prosecutor started its operation by putting into place its support system, investigators, and finally trial counsel. 44 The SCSL prosecutor also
sought to develop connections with domestic players such as the Sierra
Leone government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the people of Sierra Leone. 4 5 In addition, the prosecutor attempted to understand
the international dynamics affecting the SCSL trials by such international
players as the neighboring states, international criminal cartels, corporations, terrorists, and the heads of state who were engaged in joint criminal
46
enterprises.
Another lesson that the IST should learn from the ICTY and especially
from the trial of Slobodan Milo~evit is that the IST should avoid "mega
trials" that deal with events occurring in many places and spanning over
long periods of time. Rather than prosecute Hussein in a single trial for
crimes that occurred over a twenty-year period in Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait,
the IST should conduct five or six mini-trials, each focusing on a distinct
and separate event. The incidences should be selected according to the
strength of the evidence against Hussein and the magnitude and gravity of
the atrocity. Although this will not help to establish a comprehensive his37. See Crane, supra note 33.

38. Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone 1, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16,
2002, http://www.sc-sI.org/scsl-agreement.html
U.N. and Sierra Leone] (emphasis added).
39. Crane, supra note 33, at 2.
40. Id. at 1-2.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 2, 5, 6.
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 7.

[hereinafter Agreement between the
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toric record of the atrocities committed under the regime of Hussein, there
are other institutions and methods, such as truth commissions, which are
better equipped to accomplish that function. This selective approach will
ensure that trials can begin promptly and are not prolonged, and that the
first judgments against Hussein and his regime are handed down in time to
assist Iraq's transition into a democratic nation.
In addition to developing an initial prosecutorial strategy, like the one
employed by the SCSL, which would accomplish the mandate of the IST, it
is important for the IST investigative judges and the IST prosecutors to also
set a "new standard in judicial effectiveness that begins to establish a
respect for legal institutions. ' 47 This is especially important in Iraq where
the IST has an opportunity to positively influence the rebuilding of the
legal system and create a legacy of renewed respect for a fair judicial process and the rule of law.
C.

Challenges to the IST's Legitimacy

Lawyers hired by Hussein's wife have publicly indicated that they will
argue that the IST lacks legitimacy or lawful creation. 48 Also, during his
first pretrial hearing in July, Hussein attacked the legitimacy of the IST by
questioning the law upon which the IST was created. 49 Thus, it is possible
that Hussein's intention may be to follow in the footsteps of Milogevit, who
has been notoriously indignant in his refusal to cooperate with the ICTY.
This assumption is buttressed by the fact that Hussein and Milo~evit share
the same lawyer, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who on the
eve of Milogevit trial, publicly circulated a draft brief whose sole purpose
was to discredit the tribunal. 50 Consequently, the IST should follow the
jurisprudence of the ICTY and SCSL as guides as both the ICTY and SCSL
have been challenged by defendants on their legality.
The ICTY was established by a Security Council resolution. 5 1 A
defendant by the name Dusko Tadic was the first individual to challenge
the legality of the ICTY. The ICTY Trial Chamber held that it was not
competent to determine its legality. It stated that:
This International Tribunal is not a constitutional court set up to scrutinise
the actions of organs of the United Nations. It is, on the contrary, a criminal

tribunal with clearly defined powers, involving a quite specific and limited
47. Id.
48. See Rory McCarthy andJonathan Steele, Saddam on Trial: Legitimacy and Neutrality of Court Will Be Challenged, THE GuAoiA, July 2, 2004, at 4, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1252096,00.html.
49. Rupert Cornwell, Saddam in the Dock: Listen to His Victims, Not Saddam, Says
White House, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 2, 2004, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=537296 (reporting that Hussein stated,
"[tihis is all theater," at his first pretrial hearing).
50. See Defense Brief Challenging the Legitimacy of the Competence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal (copy on file with author), reviewed by Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the
Milosevic Trial, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 915, 920 (2003) [hereinafter Scharf, The Legacy of
the Milosevic Trial].
51. See S.C. Res 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
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criminal jurisdiction. If it is to confine its adjudications to those specific
to investigate the legality of its creation by
limits, it will have no5 authority
2
the Security Council.
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutorv. Tadic, however, disagreed with the Trial Chamber's ruling and instead found that "its inherent
power to determine the propriety of its own jurisdiction (competence de la
competence) permitted review of the legality of the [Clouncil's actions in
establishing the Tribunal." 5 3 The Appeals Chamber thus held that the
ICTY had the power to review its own legitimacy and that such power was
under the ambit of the Security Council's broad powers to establish the
ICTY. 54 The Appeals Chamber's decision precluded Tadit from raising
and trying this issue in a domestic court and from further raising the issue
55
during his ICTY trial.
The Appeals Chamber made an important point in its response to
Tadit's argument that the ICTY was not "established by law," a requirement set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). 56 The Appeals Chamber held that the requirement that the tribunal be "established by law" only mandates that the ICTY be "established in
accordance with the proper international standards and that [the ICTY
must] provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice, and even-handedness,
in full conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments." 5 7 The Appeals Chamber determined that the ICTY had fulfilled
these requirements, thus dismissing Tadit's appeal.
Six years later, during his initial appearance before the ICTY on July 3,
2001, Milogevit verbally announced his intention to challenge the legality
of the establishment of the ICTY. 58 In a pretrial motion, Milogevit stated:
"I challenge the very legality of this court because it is not established in
the basis of law." 59 He argued that the ICTY was an illegal entity because
52. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion onjurisdiction (Aug. 10, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/10
0895.htm.
53. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 104.
54. Id. at 105.
55. Id. at 104-05.
56. Id. at 105. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(1),
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://wwwl.umn.
edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm. Article 14(1) states:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination
of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Id. (emphasis added).
57. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 106.
58. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript (July 3, 2001), available at

http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/0107031A.htm. (Milogevk stated, "I consider this Tribunal a false Tribunal and the indictment a false indictment. It is illegal being not
appointed by the UN General Assembly, so I have no need to appoint counsel to [sic]
illegal organ.").
59. Milosevic Challenges the Legality of the U.N. Tribunal, ONLINE NEwsHouR, Feb.
13, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/february02/milosevic_2-13.html.
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the Security Council did not have the power to establish it.6 0 He further
argued that his arrest and transfer to The Hague in the Netherlands were
actions were in violation of the Serbian and Yugounlawful because those
61
slavian constitutions.
The Trial Chamber held that the creation of the ICTY was to "restore
international peace and security" and thus dismissed Milogevit's motion.
The Trial Chamber explained its action by noting that Security Council
Resolution 827, which established the ICTY, centered on the ICTY's role of
promoting peace and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. 62 Therefore,
the Trial Chamber held that the creation of the ICTY was within the powers
of the Security Council under Article 3963 and Article 4164 of the Charter
of the United Nations. 65 In ruling whether the Trial Chamber could determine the ICTY's legitimacy, the Trial Chamber referred to the Appeals
Chamber's decision in Tadic, which granted the tribunal the competence to
66
determine its own legality.
The SCSL was created differently than the ICTY. The SCSL was established by a treaty between the government of Sierra Leone and the United
Nations to prosecute criminals who had the greatest responsibility for violating international humanitarian law. 6 7 However, the government of
Sierra Leone also signed the Peace Agreement with the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, the Lomt Amnesty Agreement, which
granted blanket amnesty to all participants in the Sierra Leonean conflict. 68 In response to this signing, the SCSL Appeals Chamber ruled that

the Lom Amnesty Agreement was not a valid agreement before the
SCSL. 6 9 But the SCSL Appeals Chamber also noted that it was not vested
with the power to determine its own legality and explicitly stated that the
ICTY's Tadic decision was not mandatory authority and thus did not bind
it. 7 0 However, in Prosecutorv. Taylor,7 1 the Appeals Chamber came to the
conclusion that although the SCSL was established in a different manner
60. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Preliminary Motions, 1
5 (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/1110
873516829.htm [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. U.N. Charter art. 39 (giving the Security Council the power to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to
"make recommendations, or [to] decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Article[ ] [41] . . .to maintain or restore international peace and security").
64. Id. art. 41 (authorizing the Security Council to decide which "measures not
involving the use of armed force" will be taken to fulfill Article 39).
65. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, supra note 60, 3.
66. Id. 9 4.
67. Agreement between the U.N. and Sierra Leone, supra note 39.
68. Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lom Accord Amnesty (Mar. 13, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/
SCSL-04-16-PT-033-I.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Simon Meisenberg, The Lome Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (June 28, 2004), available at http://www.ifhv.de/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
71. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/SCSL-03-01-1-059.pdf.
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than the ICTY and the ICTR, the SCSL was nevertheless established in a
lawful manner by the Security Council, which had derived its power from
72
the United Nations Charter.
It is extremely likely that Hussein and other defendants tried before
the IST will seek to challenge its legitimacy and its legality. In addressing
the issue, the IST Trial and Appeals Chambers must first determine
whether they have the competency to examine their own legality and then
they can address the legality of the IST Statute. The precedents from the
ICTY and SCSL suggest that IST does have the power to examine its own
legality and the legality of its statute.
However, the IST's analysis of its legitimacy will differ from the analysis of the other ad hoc tribunals. Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the IST
was not created by a U.N. Security Council resolution. Moreover, unlike
the SCSL, the IST was not created by a treaty. The IST was established by
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) prior to the transfer of sovereignty back to Iraq.
Lawyers for Hussein have argued publicly that the IST is illegitimate
because it was created in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
which prohibits an occupying power from creating new laws or legal institutions that will exist beyond the time of conflict. Moreover, an occupying
73
power is not permitted to prosecute crimes that predate the occupation.
However, the Fourth Geneva Convention provides for three exceptions to
these prohibitions, which are applicable to the IST.
First, the Convention allows an occupying power to repeal, suspend,
or replace the penal laws and processes of the occupied territory where the
laws or processes constitute a threat to the security of the peace within the
occupied territory or the laws represent an obstacle to the application of
the Fourth Geneva Convention.74 In addition, the ICTY and the SCSL have
held that the U.N. Security Council has the power to create international
tribunals as a measure to restore peace and security. 75 Thus, an analogous
argument can be made that the creation of the IST was a measure to restore
72. See id. 37. The Appeals Chamber stated:
It was clear that the power of the Security Council to enter into an agreement for
the establishment of the court was derived from the Charter of the United
Nations both in regard to the general purposes of the United Nations as
expressed in Article 1 of the Charter and the specific powers of the Security
Council in Articles 39 and 41. These powers are wide enough to empower the
Security Council to initiate, as it did by Resolution 1315, the establishment of
the Special Court by Agreement with Sierra Leone.
Id.
73. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
arts. 64, 70, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
74. Id. art. 64.
75. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motions,
7 (Nov. 8, 2001); Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion on the Invalidity of the Agreement Between the United Nations and
the Government of Sierra Leone on Establishment of the Special Court, ' 5 (May 25,
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peace and security to the State of Iraq and its creation was thus
permissible.
Second, an occupying power is permitted to repeal, suspend, or
replace the penal laws and processes of the occupied territory where such
76
action is in the best interest of the population of the occupied territory.
It is through this exception that an occupying power can abolish courts or
tribunals that were instructed to apply inhumane or discriminatory laws.
An occupying power can create a new penal jurisdiction if it is for "the
necessity of ensuring the effective administration of justice. '77 Under that
process it can then appoint judges from the inhabitants of the occupied
territory, from the ranks of former judges, or from its own nation. But the
applicable laws must be the laws that were valid and enforceable before the
occupation.78 Since the jurisdiction of the IST covers only crimes as
defined in treaties to which Iraq has long been a party and the 1969 Iraqi
Penal Code, there is no conflict among Article 65 of the Fourth Geneva
79
Convention and the IST and its statute.
Third, an occupying power may prosecute criminal offenses committed before the occupation if those offenses constitute violations of international humanitarian law.8 0 The crimes listed in the Statute, which include
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, fall under this
exception.
Moreover, even though all the rules and the regulations created by the
occupational government of the CPA and the Governing Council were only
temporary, the interim government ratified and validated the legality of the
IST when it became the sovereign power on June 30, 2004. Using the
power granted by the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, the interim
government ratified the IST 8 1 by permitting its continuance and by directly
mentioning it in the Transitional Administrative Law, the governing laws of
Iraq during the interim government.8 2 Moreover, the interim government
did not diminish the IST authority or jurisdiction in any way. On the contrary, the interim government sustained the power of the IST by funding
the Tribunal so that IST judges could be trained and court facility could be
built, and by supporting and enforcing the issuance of indictments and the
commencement of investigative hearings.
76. See Geneva IV, supra note 73, art. 64.
77. Id. art. 64.

78.

JEAN

PICTET,

COMMENTARIES TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF

12

AUGUST

1949, at 336. (discussing article 64).
79. See Geneva IV, supra note 73, art. 65.
80. Id. art. 70.
81. Under Security Council Resolution 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (2004), the
interim government was recognized as having full power and sovereignty of the State of
Iraq. The record of debate on the resolution made it clear that the Security Council saw
the transfer of power from the CPA to the interim government as the end of occupation.
U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4987th mtg. at 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4987 (June 8, 2004).
82. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period art. 48(A),
Mar. 8, 2004, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html ("The statute
establishing the Iraqi Special Tribunal issued on 10 December 2003 is confirmed.").
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Moreover, once the power of the interim government was transferred
to the newly elected representatives of the transitional government in February 2005, it too confirmed the validity and continuance of the IST.
Although it did not explicitly reassert the legitimacy of the IST through
legislation, it nevertheless endorsed the IST and its statute by continuing to
fund it, a governmental action meant to remove any doubt about the validity of the IST.
Additionally, the legitimacy of the IST is buttressed by its procedural
structure. The IST contains all of the due process protections required
under international law and guaranteed by all the ad hoc war crimes tribunals. These procedural protections, granted to defendants, include the presumption of innocence, the right to be informed promptly and in detail of
the charges and to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense
and to communicate freely with counsel of choice, the right to be tried
without undue delay, the right to be present during trial and to appointment of counsel, the right to have counsel present during questioning, the
right to examine and confront witnesses, the right against self-incrimination and not to have courts assume guilt by simply exercising one's right to
remain silent, and the right to disclosure by the prosecution of all exculpa83
tory evidence and witness statements, and the right to appeal.
D.

Limiting the "Right to Self-Representation"

Like the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, the IST Statute provides that the accused has a right to "defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing."'8 4 It is likely that Hussein, who has a
law degree from Cairo University, will follow Milogevit's lead and attempt
to represent himself during his upcoming trial, notwithstanding the fact
that his wife has hired a team of international lawyers to represent him.
Hussein has undoubtedly seen the success Milo~evit has enjoyed using his
right to self-representation to transform his criminal trial into a political
stage. Also, as Milogevit had done before the ICTY, Hussein took the
opportunity at his first appearance before the IST on July 1, 2004 to
expound his political views as well as to verbally attack the 2003 invasion
of Iraq. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that Hussein will attempt to
represent himself, with the army of his international lawyers assisting him
from behind the scenes.
The ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL vary in their treatment of the right to
self-representation. The ICTY's decision to allow Milogevie to represent
himself during his trial had significant repercussions on the orderly conduct of the trial. During Milogevit's initial appearance before the ICTY, he
refused to enter a plea and declined to accept court-appointed legal representation.8 5 The prosecution raised its concern that Milogevit would be
83. IST Statute, supra note 2, art. 20; IST Rules, supra note 10, R. 46, 60, 62.
84. 1ST Statute, supra note 2, art. 20(d).
85. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, supra note 58.
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unable to adequately represent himself8 6 but the Trial Chamber denied the
prosecution's request for appointment of counsel and ruled that even
though Milogevit has a right to counsel under customary international law,
he also "has a right not to have counsel" and "to represent himself."'8 7 The
Chamber further stated: "It would not be practical to impose counsel on an
accused who wishes to represent himself."8 8 This decision enabled
Milogevit to turn the ICTY Trial Chambers into his own personal stage to
make "unfettered speeches throughout the trial" and to mistreat the prosecution, witnesses and the trial chamber judges in a way that would never
be permitted by ordinary defense counsel.8 9
But during the same initial appearance, the Trial Chamber also
decided to appoint amicus curiae counsel. 90 This decision would not compromise Milogevit's right to self-representation since the amicus curiae's
role is not to represent Milogevit, but rather to ensure that Milogevit will
get a fair trial by assisting the Trial Chamber in the proper administration
of justice. However, appointing amicus curiae was not a perfect solution.
First, "amicus counsel is not a party to the trial and [thus it] may disturb
the adversarial nature of the proceeding." 9 1 Secondly, in this case, the
appointment of amicus counsel did not substantially affect the trial since
rather than defend himself against the charges, Milo~evit used his time in
court to "play on Serbia's psychological vulnerabilities and continued Serb
'
resentment of the 1999 NATO bombing. "92
However, the court's decision to appoint legal counsel would have
made a difference since in June 2004, it became apparent that for health
reasons Milo~evit would not be able to continue to defend himself before
the ICTY.9 3 His defense was postponed numerous times on account of his
ill health and on September 22, 2004, the Trial Chamber concluded that
Milo~evi was not physically fit to represent himself and that if he did continue to do so, there would be further delays. 9 4 The Trial Chamber thus
ruled that the right to self-representation is not absolute and that the Trial
86. In requesting that the ICTY consider appointing counsel in addition to amicus
counsel, the prosecution pointed out that Milogevit submitted a "confusing" motion that
"if counsel were assigned to him, these matters would not be as confusing." Prosecutor
v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript, at 16 (Aug. 30, 2001).
87. Id. at 18.
88. Id.
89. Michael P. Scharf and Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have an International Right to Self-Representation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 3,
4 (2005).
90. Simon Meisenberg, The Right to Self Representation Before the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, June 19, 2004, availableat http://www.ifhv.de/.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 3, quoting Dusko Doder, Book Review of Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia by Louis Sell, THE NATION, May 27, 2002, at 25.
93. See Ian Black, Milosevic's Poor Health Hits Trial: Judge Orders Radical Review as
New Delay Halts Defense Case, THE GUARDIAN, July 6, 2004, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/yugo/article/0,2763,1254973,00.html.
94. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defense Counsel (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/
0409021T.htm.
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Chamber is competent to assign counsel "in the interests of justice." 95 The
Trial Chamber stated that "[t]he fundamental duty of the Trial Chamber is
to ensure that the trial is fair and expeditious" and it decided to assign
counsel to Milogevit. 9 6 Milogevit's amicus curiae appealed the Trial
Chamber decision and on November 1, 2004, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
ruled in favor of Milogevk and decided that he had a right to defend himself but that he must have standby counsel if his "health problems resur'97
face with sufficient gravity."
The ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, however, did not follow the
lead of the ICTY and instead imposed counsel on the accused in the interest of justice. 9 8 Barayagwiza filed a motion with the Trial Chamber to withdraw his counsel's mandate to represent him. The Trial Chamber refused
to grant his motion and held that "only in 'most exceptional circumstances'
will Counsel assigned by the Tribunal to represent an accused be permitted
to withdraw from the case." 9 9 The Trial Chamber further stated that
appointed counsel "[is] under an obligation to continue to represent an
accused to the best of his [or her] ability, unless the Chamber decides that
they are permitted to withdraw." 10 0 The Trial Chamber observed that
Barayagwiza did not lack confidence in his lawyers but wanted them to
withdraw from his case because he did not believe he would be given a fair
trial. 0 ' The Trial Chamber found this allegation to be without foundation
and rejected Barayagwiza's motion because it was "merely boycotting the
10 2
trial and obstructing the course of justice.
The SCSL encountered the issue of a defendant's right to self-representation in Prosecutor v. Norman.10 3 In that case, Sam Hinga Norman, the
former Minister of Interior Affairs of Sierra Leone, was jointly charged with
two other persons for crimes against humanity and war crimes. 10 4 After
the prosecutor's opening statements, Norman notified the Trial Chamber
that he decided to defend himself.10 5 During pretrial hearings and
motions, Norman was represented by counsel that he had picked.
Although the Trial Chamber stated that it was "[m]indful of the International Human Rights norms which guarantee both a right of self-represen95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, ' 20
(Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-e/041
101.htm.
98. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defense Counsel
Motion to Withdraw (Nov. 2, 2000), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/
Barayagwiza/decisions/021 100.htm.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application of
Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of
the Special Court (June 8, 2004).
104. Meisenberg, supra note 90.
105. Id.
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tation and a right of legal assistance," 10 6 it rejected Norman's request for
three reasons. First, Norman was being tried with two co-defendants.
Allowing Norman to represent himself would be "to the detriment of the
rights of his two co-accused to a fair and expeditious trial."' 0 7 Second,
Norman made his request "after over a year of pre-trial detention" and if he
was permitted to assume his own defense, it "would necessarily result in
unnecessarily prolonging the proceedings." 10 8 Third, the right to self-representation is not an absolute but a qualified right. 10 9 The Trial Chamber
agreed with a U.S. court decision, which warned that the right to self-representation "threatens to divert criminal trials from their clearly defined purpose of providing a fair and reliable determination of guilt or
innocence."110
The SCSL eventually assigned standby counsel to Norman, while preserving his right to self-representation."' The Trial Chamber defined the
role of standby counsel by stating that they would "assist [him] in the exercise of [his] self-representation . . . preparation and presentation of [his]
case during the trial phase ... offer legal advice ... and address the Court
whenever [he] request[s] them to address the Court." 112 The SCSL's decision to appoint standby counsel instead of amicus curiae was significant
since standby counsel are party to the trial and thus do not disturb the
3
adversarial process. 1
In the event that Hussein will evoke his right to self-representation, the
IST should carefully examine and learn from the trial of the defendant
most similar to him, Milogevit. Like Milogevit, Hussein is a former head of
state and is notorious for his alleged war crimes. Moreover, as in the case
of Miloevi, Hussein's trial is likely to be intently observed not just by his
former subjects, the Iraqis, but by the world community. Although the
Statute states that the accused has the right to self-representation, it is
ambiguous on whether this right is absolute. The Milosevic Appeals Chamber held that "the right [to self-representation] may be curtailed on the
grounds that a defendant's self-representation is substantially and persistently obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial." 114 And
as already illustrated by Milogevi s trial and the initial appearance of Hussein, former leaders are likely to act in a disruptive behavior during trial as
they publicly challenge the court's authority to try them.
106. Prosecutor v. Norman, supra note 103.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript (une 10, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Transcripts/CDF-061004.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Meisenberg, supra note 90.
114. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, '1 9, 13
(Nov. 1, 2004).
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The IST should also consider the extensive U.S. jurisprudence on the
subject of self-representation, and pay special attention to the U.S. courts'
treatment of disruptive defendants. For example, in Faretta v. California,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment
right to conduct his or her own defense in a criminal case.1 5 However, the
U.S. Supreme Court restricted this pronouncement by stating that such a
"right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the
courtroom." As discussed below, since Faretta,several federal courts have
found that the right to self-representation may be revoked if the defendant
abuses this right by acting in a disruptive manner during his or her trial.
Under American jurisprudence, the right to counsel is the paramount
right in relation to the right to self-representation. 1 16 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit noted: "[I]f [the right to counsel is] wrongly
denied, the defendant is likely to be more seriously injured than if denied
his [or her] right to proceed pro se." 117 However, as in the case of selfrepresentation, the right to counsel has limitations. In Tuitt v. Fair, the
appellant, who was convicted of armed robbery and carrying a firearm
without lawful authority, alleged that his right to counsel was infringed
when the court denied his requests for a continuance, for a substitution of
counsel, and for permission to proceed unrepresented. 118 On appeal, the
First Circuit held that "[tihe right to counsel is subject to practical constraints," 119 such that "the right of an accused to choose his own counsel
cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct reasonable and
orderly court procedure." 120 Similarly, in United States v. Mack, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that a defendant's right
to self-representation does not overcome the court's right to maintain order
in the courtroom. 12 ' The court further reasoned that "[a] defendant does
not forfeit his right to representation at trial when he acts out. He merely
forfeits his right to represent himself in the proceeding."' 22 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Cauley also refused to
allow a disruptive defendant to dismiss his legal aid lawyer and proceed

unrepresented.' 2 3 The court found that his "behavior in court was that of
an easily angered man," 124 and noted that the defendant "interrupted the
115. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
116. Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 177 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d
597, 601 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cauley, 697 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Harris,
317 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544-45 (D.NJ. 2004).
117. Tuitt, 822 F.2d at 177.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 1977).
121. Mack, 362 F.3d at 601 (referring to where the appeals court reversed the trial
court's conviction because the district court removed the defendant from the courtroom,
leaving no one to represent him. The court found this to be a structural error that violated the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment).
122. Id.
123. 697 F.2d at 491.
124. Id. at 490.
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cross-examination . . . with shouted obscenities."1 25 He also refused to
answer questions posed to him. Similarly, in United States v. West, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sustained the lower court's ruling
that that the defendant had forfeited his right to self-representation by
attacking its "integrity and dignity by characterizing it as the 'home team'
on the side of the government" and thus "flouting the responsibility" given
to him. 1 26 And most recently, in United States v. Harris,the federal district
127
court in New Jersey denied a defendant's request to self-representation
since the court found that the defendant had refused to acknowledge the
authority of the court, showed disrespect for the court, and that his
attempts to proceed unrepresented were meant to only disrupt the
court. 1

28

Similar behavior has been found in cases of former leaders prosecuted
before war crimes tribunals. As the description of Milogevit's antics above
illustrates, these individuals openly question the legitimacy of the court,
act disrespectfully toward the judges, make speeches during cross-examination, and browbeat and verbally abuse witnesses. In the ordinary case, a
judge can control this behavior by threatening to expel the individual from
the courtroom, impose fines or prison time on him or her, or to even suspend the license of an attorney who acted in this a manner. However, these
modes of discipline are not available to the judges in cases where the defendant is representing himself or herself. Accordingly, the IST should take
into consideration the experiences of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, and rule
that this type of inherently disruptive behavior can justify the appointment
of defense counsel over the accused's desire for self-representation in war
crimes trials.
E. To Televise or Not to Televise?
Public accountability of Hussein's trial would be enhanced through
television cameras in the courtroom by showing the Iraqis a fair judicial
process and thus helping them to heal and basically reassuring the public
that justice is being carried out. However, there are risks associated with
this medium that can be abused and manipulated to Hussein's advantage.
It is likely that Hussein and his lawyers will take a chapter out of
Milogevit's trial book and attempt to turn his criminal trial coverage into a
political forum to make speeches and political arguments unrelated to the
question of his guilt or his innocence.
The ICTY quickly learned about the power of television. Rule 78 of
the ICTY Rules of Procedure ("ICTY Rules") states that "[aill proceedings
before a Trial Chamber, other than deliberations of the Chamber, shall be
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 491.
877 F.2d at 287.
317 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
Id. at 546.
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held in public, unless otherwise provided. ' 129 In an effort to achieve one
of its aims of helping Serbs, Croats, Albanians and Bosnian Muslims heal
their wounds from atrocities committed during wars in the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY televises Milogevic's trial. However, the effects of this decision did not facilitate reconciliation but instead generated admiration and
0
13
sympathy for Milogevit in Serbia.

Milogevit appears on television screens back in Serbia as "a solitary
individual pitted against an army of foreign lawyers and investigators,
[which has helped to] boost his underdog appeal." 13 1 Additionally, his

"sharp," "funny," and "cynical" courtroom dramatic antics has garnered
him admiration in Serbia. 13 2 It has also been reported in current opinion
polls that seventy-five percent of Serbs "do not feel that Milo~evit is getting
a fair trial."' 133 Also, sixty-seven percent
of Serbs think that Milo~evit is
"not responsible for any war crimes." 134
The use of television cameras in U.S. courtrooms has also been the
subject of much debate and controversy. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."'135 The U.S. Supreme Court
first addressed the issue of cameras in the courtroom in 1965 in Estes v.
Texas, a criminal case involving an accused embezzler. 136 In Estes, the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that he had been deprived of13 a7
fair trial due to the disruptive media presence in the Texas courtroom.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held that while U.S. law favors public
proceedings, this safeguard does not require that they be televised or audio
recorded. The Supreme Court also noted that "the public has the right to
be informed as to what occurs in its courts, but [it is not mandatory that
courts protect this right by mandating that cameras be in courtrooms
since] reporters are always present [in the courtroom and] if they wish
[they can freely] report whatever occurs in open court [without the need of
1 38
a camera]."'
Several American legal commentators and scholars have articulated
the advantages and the disadvantages of televising criminal trials in the
129. International Criminal Tribuanl for the former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence R. 78, Mar. 14, 1994, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.7, available at http://wwwl.
umn.edu/humanrts/icty/ct-rules7.html [hereinafter ICTY Rules].
130. Marc Champion, Court of Opinion: With Hague Case, Defiant Milosevic Wins Fans
at Home As Daily Coverage Keeps Serbs Riveted to TV, Many Feel As if They're on Trial,
Too, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2003, at Al.
131. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, supra note 50, at 917.
132. Champion, supra note 130.
133. Michael P. Scharf, Making a Spectacle of Himself: Milosevic Wants a Stage, Not the
Right to Provide His Own Defense, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at Outlook, B2.
134. Id.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
136. 381 U.S. 532 (1965), reviewed by David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice:
Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understandingof the CriminalJustice System, 35 Amiz. L. REv. 785, 799 (1993).
137. Estes, 381 U.S. 532.
138. Id. at 541-42.
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United States. Some of the benefits of televised criminal trials mentioned
are: (1) they educate the public on the criminal justice system and the
law; 13 9 (2) they have therapeutic and cathartic value for the victims and the
public; and (3) they allow the public to act "as a check [on] the judicial
process." 140 However, there are also often cited reasons for excluding cameras from courtrooms since they affect and usually diminish the defendant's prospect for a fair trial. For example: (1) "[tlhe presence of
broadcast media can inhibit witnesses" from testifying, thereby, impairing
the ability of the prosecution and defense from obtaining evidence; 14 1 (2)
cameras "may allow judges and lawyers to play to the camera[s,] creating a
celebrity status for them" and thus depriving defendants of effective counsel and fair and impartial decisions by judges; 1 4 2 and (3) "heightened public clamor resulting from . .. television coverage will inevitably result in
14 3
prejudice."
In determining whether a trial should be televised, U.S. courts have
resolved this issue differently and based on distinct and varying criteria.
For example, some jurisdictions outright prohibit televising trials, while
others allow cameras in courtrooms in certain cases but impose guidelines
and restrictions on media coverage. 14 4 For instance, according to state law
and a set of guidelines published by the Missouri Supreme Court, media
coverage is not permitted in a Missouri courtroom without the express permission of the trial judge. 14 5 Moreover, a Missouri trial judge has the
power to deny permission for media coverage if he or she finds that "media
coverage would interfere materially with the rights of a party to a fair
responsibilities and restrictrial."1 4 6 The Missouri guidelines also14impose
7
tions on the use of media equipment.
Although, the problems posed by Milogevit do not lie solely with the
ICTY's decision to televise his trial, it is evident that television is a powerful
medium that can be abused by Hussein and his lawyers during his trial.
Hence, even though the Statute provides that the IST hearings "shall be
public unless the Trial Chamber decides to close the proceedings," the IST
should proceed with caution over this issue and avoid the mistakes committed by the ICTY.148 For example, as an alternative to gavel-to-gavel cov139. Harris, supra note 136, at 819.

140. Dolores K. Sloviter, If Courts Are Open, Must Cameras Follow?, 26 HOFsTmA L.
REv. 873, 886 (1998).
141. Gregory K. McCall, Cameras in the Criminal Courtroom: A Sixth Amendment Analysis, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1546, 1552 (1985).
142. Joyce M. Cossin, The Pros and Cons of Television in the Courtroom, PSYCH. J.,
Spring 2003, available at http://www.wcu.edu/ceap/psychology/journal/pdf/Cossin-j8-03.pdf.
143. Estes, 381 U.S. 532, at 549.
144. See BETH RIGGERT, CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM: A GUIDE TO MISSOUI'S COURT
OPERATING RULE 16 (2003), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/O/ea
6 lc4a40450464e86256e36006ffbb9?OpenDocument.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. IST Statute, supra note 2, art. 21(d).
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erage, the IST press office could release daily highlights of the trial to the
media pool.
F.

The Role of Fair Trial Observers

The IST Statute requires the President of the IST to appoint non-Iraqi
trial observers or advisers. 1 49 The role of these appointed observers or
advisers is to "provide assistance to the judges with respect to international
law and the experience of similar tribunals (whether international or otherwise), and to monitor the protection by the Tribunal of general due process
of law standards."'150 If needed, the President of the IST may call upon the
international community for assistance.1 5 1 The IST Statute requires that
observers or advisers be "persons of high moral character, impartiality and
integrity."' 5 2 Moreover, the IST Statute prefers observers or advisers to be
persons who "have acted in either a judicial or prosecutorial capacity in his
or her respective country," or persons who "have experience in interna53
tional war crimes trials or tribunals."'
Observes and advisors in international law cases, fair trial observers
(FTOs), have been used as far back as 1498 and since the end of World
War II. With time, their role has become more accepted within the framework of customary international law. 154 Recently, FTOs have been
selected from politically unbiased NGOs. 155 FTOs, as formal observers of
trials, play an important role in ensuring the effective and fair administration of justice by observing trial processes and applying legal knowledge
56
and training.1
And even though FTOs have never been used in international criminal
tribunals, 1 57 it does not mean that their participation would not have been
beneficial to certain past international criminal tribunal cases. The key
goals of a trial observer, according to the International Commission of
Jurists' Guidelines, are as follows:
1. To make known to the court, the authorities of the country and to the
general public the interest and concerns motivating the prosecution;

2. To encourage a court to give the accused a fair trial. The impact of an
observer's presence in a courtroom cannot be evaluated with mathematical
precision. However, both observers and defense attorneys have pointed out

that a monitor's presence often changes the atmosphere in the courtroom
and facilitates the defense by, inter alia, making the court more cognizant of
149. Id. art. 6(b).
150. Id.

151. Id.
152. Id. art. 6(c).

153. Id.
154. Memorandum from Ryan C. Scott, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law International War Crimes Research Lab, to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR,
Is There a Role for "Fair Trial Observers" in International Criminal Law Trials? at 1 (Fall
2003), available at http://www.law.case.edu/war-crimes-research-portal.

155. Id.
156. Id. at 2.

157. See id.
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the defense's arguments, encouraging the defense counsel and the defendant
to be more forceful in contesting the prosecution's claims, and moreover, the
presence of an observer will attract the media's attention to the trial;
3. To obtain more information about the conduct of the trial, the nature of
the case against the accused and the legislation under which he or she is
being tried; and
4. To collect general background information about the political and legal
leading to the trial and their possible effect on the trial's
circumstances
15 8
outcome.
However, in spite of the many benefits behind employing FTOs, the
IST should also be aware of the potential risks associated with use of FTOs.
For example, in the trial of the two Libyans accused of bombing Pan Am
Flight 103 before a special Scottish court sitting in The Netherlands (the
"Lockerbie trial"), the United Nations appointed Dr. Hans K6echler, a professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, to
observe the trial pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1192, adopted on
August 27, 1998.159 Dr. K6echler produced and delivered a damning
report of the administration of justice at the Lockerbie trial, claiming that
the outcome of the trial was politically motivated and basically "not
fair."'160 Dr. K6echler's report unleashed a torrent of criticism. In
response, a spokesman for the Crown Office, which handled the Lockerbie
trial, replied that Dr. Koechler had "completely misunderstood" the trial
and its procedures.' 6 ' Similarly, a member of the Lockerbie briefing unit
said that Dr. K6echler "displayed a 'profound misunderstanding' of the
162
Scottish adversarial legal system."'
Dr. Koechler's report triggered questions about his role as an international observer of the Lockerbie trial and the general duties of FTOs. Hans
Corell, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs of the United Nations,
163
made a statement that distanced the United Nations from the report.
Mr. Corell insisted that Dr. K6echler's remarks constituted his "personal
views" and that the "United Nations [could not] be associated with the
observations made" by Dr. K6echler and the other observers. 16 4 Mr.
Corell also stated that Dr. K6echler was "not require[d] to produce and
submit" his observations and that he represented his own organization, the
International Progress Organization, and not the United Nations at the
158. Id. at 10.
159. See S.C. Res. 1192, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1192 (1998); Neil Mackay, U.N. Claims
Lockerbie Trial Rigged: Court was Politically Influenced by U.S., THE SUNDAY HERALD (Scotland), Apr. 8, 2001, at 1.
160. HANs KOECHLER, REPORT ON AND EVALUATION OF THE LOcKERBIE TIAL (2001),
available at http://i-p-o.org/lockerbie-report.htm.
161. Mackay, supra note 159, at 1.
162. UN Monitor Decries Lockerbie Judgement, BBC NEws, Mar. 14, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/1872996.stm.
163. Letter from Hans Corell, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, United
Nations, to Mr. and Mrs. Cohen (May 31, 2001), available at http://i-p-o.org/lockerbiecorell.htm.
164. Id.
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Lockerbie trial.
Dr. K6echler, disagreeing with the United Nations' interpretation of
the duties and responsibilities of an international observer, noted that his
mission as an observer would have been "meaningless" if he were to simply
observe the trial without reporting his observations to anyone. 16 6 He also
stated that "the only meaningful interpretation of 'international observer'
. . . must be to observe the proceedings of the court in regard to basic
aspects of fairness and due process, and to share the observations, when
appropriate, with the United Nations Organization and the international
167
public."'
Hence, the IST should be careful in its selections of FTOs, since FTOs
will play an important "watchdog" role as he or she will be entrusted with
the duty to ensure that trials are conducted fairly. Moreover, the participation of FTOs will be significant since the world is watching and the IST will
want to show the world community that it can competently police itself.
Also, the use of FTOs can serve as a safeguard against charges of victor's
justice claims. 168 Accordingly, the IST will have to select unbiased third
parties sent by NGOs as their FTOs since these individuals will be fair and
thus will satisfy the IST Statute requirement of "impartiality."
G.

Handling the Tu Quoque Defense

The Latin phrase tu quoque means "thou also" or "you too."' 169 An
accused raising the tu quoque defense claims justification for his or her acts
as a response to the actions of the State or rebuts the charges of the State by
claiming that the State cannot prosecute him or her since the State behaved
in a similar culpable manner as the accused. 170 In other words, the
accused is saying, "You cannot fairly criticize me on that basis, for you are
just as bad. You are doing the same yourself.' 1 7 1 The defense of tu quoque
is not invoked to convince the other side "to desist from its unlawful conduct... but as an estoppel against the [State's] subsequent attempt to call
into question the lawfulness of the same kind of conduct of the
[accused]."' 17 2 The tu quoque defense has been attempted by individuals
accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in the
Nuremberg tribunal as well as the ICTY. It is likely that Hussein will also
165. Id.
166. Statement, Hans K6echler, Misunderstandings and Conflicting Interpretations
of His Report on and Evaluation of the Trial, as Expressed in Official Statements and in
the Subsequent International Media Coverage, at 1 Uune 9, 2001), availableat http://i-po.org/Lockerbie-statement-koechler.htm.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. Memorandum from Stephanie Berlin, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law International War Crimes Research Lab, to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR,
The Tu Quoque Defense, at 4 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.law.case.edu/warcrimes-research-portal; Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, supra note 50, at 925.
170. See Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, supra note 50, at 925.
171. Berlin, supra note 169, at 4.
172. Id. at 9.
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attempt to raise this defense and claim American involvement and culpability in the crimes with which he is charged.
The tu quoque defense has had marginal success in the Nuremberg
tribunal and the ICTY. Only one defendant at the Nuremberg trial, Grand
Admiral Karl Donitz, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy from 1943
and succeeding to the position of head of state from Adolf Hitler in 1945,
was acquitted after he used this defense. 1 73 One of Donitz's charges
involved waging unrestrictive submarine warfare. In response to this accusation, he argued that his order forbade him from allowing German naval
ships to help survivors from a sunken British vessel, the Laconia, and that
he could not be guilty of wagering unrestricted submarine warfare since
American navy officers had an identical policy. 174 Donitz's defense pro-

cured evidence from U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of the
American fleet in the Pacific, where the Admiral admitted that the U.S.
Navy had a similar policy. 1 7 5 Instead of claiming that Donitz's actions

were justified because the Americans had a similar policy, Donitz's defense
argued that neither the German nor the American policy was itself illegal
since "the universality of these acts demonstrated that the laws of war had
1 76
changed through practice so as to free them of their illegal character."
The Nuremberg tribunal, without ever stating that it had accepted Donitz'
tu quoque defense, did not convict him of unrestricted submarine warfare.
The ICTY addressed this issue in the case of Prosecutor v. Kupreskic,
where the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that the tu quoque defense is "irrelevant because it does not tend to prove or disprove any of the allegations
made in the indictment against the accused.' 77 The Kupreskic case
involved six defendants who allegedly helped Bosnian Croat forces kill
more than one hundred Bosnian Muslim civilians and destroy property
including two mosques in 1993.178 The six defendants sought to use a tu
quoque defense and argue that Bosnian Muslims had committed similar or
more heinous atrocities against Bosnian Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 179 In rejecting the tu quoque defense, the Trial Chamber reiterated its
previous view that "the tu quoque principle does not apply to international
humanitarian law."'180 It further stated that the obligations to comply with
international humanitarian law are "designed to safeguard fundamental
human values and therefore must be complied with regardless of the conduct of the other party or parties."' 1
It is likely that Hussein and other members of his former regime will
attempt to raise the tu quoque defense and argue that the United States,
173. Id. at 15.
174. Id. at 18.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16, Decision on Evidence of the Good
Character of the Accused and the Defense of Tu Quoque, at 3 (Feb. 17, 1999).
178. Berlin, supra note 169, at 25.
179. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, supra note 177, at 3.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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which authorized the Iraqi Governing Council to create the IST, illegally
invaded Iraq or were involved in the crimes with which Hussein and his
regime are charged. In addition, because the Nuremberg and ICTY tribunals' practice of generally rejecting the tu quoque defense has drawn criticism from some quarters of the world, since such a policy reinforces the
notion of victor's justice,18 2 the IST should be careful in its handling of the
tu quoque defense so as not appear to be trammeling over the rights of the
defendant. Accordingly, the IST may be forced to allow Hussein to raise
the issue of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 in the context of arguing that the definition of the crime of aggression is not clearly established,
as the Nuremberg tribunal allowed Donitz to raise Nimitz's actions to show
that the law on submarine warfare had not been clearly defined. However,
in other contexts, the IST should only permit Hussein to introduce evidence of U.S. lawlessness or complicity in his crimes that is relevant to
disproving his charges or establishing a valid defense.
H.

Protection of Witnesses

Frequently in international criminal tribunals, obtaining cooperation
of witnesses has hinged on the ability of the prosecution to protect those
witnesses.1 8 3 This issue was first raised in the trial of Dusko Tadic. In that
case, much to the chagrin of many ICTY observers, the prosecutor was
forced to abandon rape charges after its only rape witness refused to teshad been threatened and
tify.1 8 4 She explained that she and her family
85
thus she was no longer willing to testify.'
And as important as its ability to ensure cooperation from witness to
achieve a conviction, a war crimes tribunal's ability to protect witnesses
18 6 If
also directly affects its legitimacy and its image to the world.
criminals are able to intimidate witnesses into refusing to testify, the judicial process will be rendered ineffective and the tribunal's legitimacy will
be significantly eroded.187
As in the case of the IST, the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY Statute") guarantees the accused
the right "to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him." 188
However, Rule 69 of the ICTY Rules provides for the protection of victims
and witnesses. It states that in exceptional circumstances, the prosecutor
may request a judge or the Trial Chamber to shield the identity of a particular victim or witness who is in danger until such person is brought under
182. See Berlin, supra note 169, at 22.
183. Memorandum from Sarah Suscinski, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law International War Crimes Research Lab, to the Office of the Prosecutor, Witness
Protection, at 1 (Nov. 2002), available at www.law.case.edu/war-crimes-research-portal.
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art.
21(4)(e), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192, available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/
statut/statute.htm [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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the protection of the ICTY. 18 9
Specific measures provided to protect victims and witnesses include
nondisclosure to the public or media of the witnesses' identity or their
whereabouts. 190 For example, names may be expunged from public court
records or testimony may be given through voice-altering devices. 1 9 1 The
ICTY has also created a Victims and Witnesses Section. The Victims and
Witnesses Section is a specialized department within the ICTY Registry
that provides assistance to victims and witnesses. There are three units of
the Victims and Witnesses Section: "the Protection Unit[J,] which coordinates responses to the security requirements, the Support Unit[,I
which provides social and psychological counseling and assistance to witnesses, and the Operations Unit[,] which is responsible for logistical operations and witness administration."' 19 2 The Victims and Witnesses Unit
duties range from assisting disabled witnesses with their travels to temporary or permanent relocating witnesses who have received serious threats
to their lives. 19 3
But generally, subject to rules providing for specific measures, the
identity of victims or witnesses has to be disclosed to the defense to allow
him or her sufficient time to prepare his or her case. 1 94 There is an obvious need to protect witnesses but there is also a need to protect the right of
the accused to have a fair trial and the opportunity to confront witnesses
who testify against the defendant. This balance was addressed in Prosecutor v. Tadic. In that case, the ICTY Prosecutor's Office filed a motion
requesting protection of certain witnesses. 19 5 The prosecution asked that
19 6
some of the witnesses' identities be kept from the public and the media.
For other witnesses, the prosecution asked that their identities be completely shielded from the accused or his lawyers. 197 The Trial Chamber
created a five-prong test, which must be satisfied in order to grant a motion
of witness anonymity. 198 The requirements are:
1. There must be "an existence of a real fear for the safety of the witness;"
2. The prosecution must show that the witness's testimony is "sufficiently
relevant and important to the case;"
3. "There must be no prima facie evidence of the witness's unworthiness in
any way;"
4. There is no witness protection program in existence; and
189. ICTY Rules, supra note 129, R. 69.
190. Id. R. 75.
191. Id.
192. ICTY Outreach Programme, View From The Hague: Witnesses Given Every Support Testifying Before the ICTY, Feb. 18, 2004, available at http://www.un.org/icty/bhs/
outreach/articles/eng/article-040218e.htm.
193. Id.
194. See ICTY Rules, supra note 129, R. 70.
195. Suscinski, supra note 183, at 19.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 20.
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5. There are no less restrictive protective measures available. 1 9 9

In addition, the Trial Chamber also ruled that providing the defendant
an opportunity to examine anonymous witnesses does not violate the
defendant's rights. 20 0 In addition, the Trial Chamber held that in such
cases:

1. Judges must be able to observe the demeanor of the witness "in order to
assess the reliability of the testimony."
2. Judges must be aware of the identity of the witness.
3. The defense must be allowed ample opportunity to question the witness
on matters unrelated to his or her identity or his or her current whereabouts.
4. The identity of the witness must be
disclosed where there is no longer any
201
reason to fear for his or her safety.
However, the Tadic Chamber's decision to permit witness anonymity
under some circumstances has been highly criticized since the defense
counsel cannot conduct an effective and detailed cross-examination if he or
she does not know the identity of the witness. 20 2 Perhaps, as a result of
this criticism, the ICTY and ICTR tribunals have not subsequently granted
a motion precluding the defense from knowing a witness' identity.
Unfortunately, protecting the rights of the defendant has come at a
cost. There have been several cases in the ICTY where witnesses were
harassed or intimated by defendants. In 1999, the ICTY found Milan Vujin
guilty of "interfering with witnesses in a manner which dissuaded them
from telling the truth. ' 20 3 Vujin was fined 15,000 NLG (L4,120). Later,
defense counsel for Tihomir Bla~kid was found in contempt and fined for
disclosing the identity and occupation of a protected witness. 20 4 The ICTY
in the trial of Blagkie held:
[Tihe victims and witnesses merit protection, even from the accused, during
the preliminary proceedings and continuing until a reasonable time before
the state of the trial itself; from that time forth, however, the right of the
accused to an equitable trial must take precedence and require that the veil
of anonymity be lifted in his favour, even if20the
veil must continue to
5
obstruct the view of the public and the media.
In the case of IST, prosecutions will heavily depend on witness testimony. The IST Rules also provide for a Victims and Witnesses Unit and
measures for the protection of victims and witnesses, which parallels the
199. Id. at 20-22.
200. See id. at 19-20.
201. Id. at 22-23; RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGosLAvIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY

107 (Oxford Univ. Press

2004).
202. See e.g., Michael Scharf and Valerie Epps, The InternationalTrial of the Century?
A "Cross-Fire" Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 29
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 635, 654 (1996).
203. KERR, supra note 201, at 108.

204. Id. at 109.
205. Id. at 110.
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provisions found in the ICTY and ICTR statutes and rules. 20 6 Some commentators have suggested that international tribunals, such as the IST,
could appeal to U.N. member countries to grant political asylum and supply new identities to victims and witnesses, since they fall under the category of persecuted ethnic minorities and thus could arguably qualify for
refugee status. 20 7 However, this proposal is troublesome since it could
entice witnesses to make false claims in the hope of escaping Iraq.
I.

The Preference for Live In-Court Witness Testimony

If the ICTY trials have been a harbinger of things to come for the IST,
the issue of live in-court testimony will surely be a contentious matter that
the IST judges should examine carefully. There has been sharp criticism of
the ICTY's problem of lagging trials, which is attributed in part to the substantial amount of witness testimony. ICTY trials, on average, have a hundred witnesses or more and each witness' testimony can last up to a full
trial day. 20 8 A substantial portion of witness testimony involves "background events leading up to indicated offenses, jurisdictional prerequisites
to the charges, the impact of the alleged crimes on the victims, or factors
' 20 9
that aggravate or mitigate the accused's guilt."

In an effort to cut down on long and drawn out testimony that is repetitive or testimony that does not go directly to the heart of the charges
against the accused, the ICTY has created ways to shorten the amount of
time consuming testimony and to ensure speedier trials. Since 1994, the
ICTY has revised its Rules of Evidence, which includes provisions related
to testimony of witnesses, 2 10 and it has undergone numerous revisions in
response to time consuming trials and external pressure to fulfill its mandate to try individual "without undue delay."
The original ICTY Rules, enacted in 1994, strongly preferred live incourt witness testimony over written witness testimony. Moreover, Article
21(4)(e) of the ICTY Statute entitles the accused "to examine, or have
examined, the witnesses against him," 2 1 1 and Rule 90 of the ICTY Rules
originally provided that "witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by
the Chambers. '2 12 However, Rule 89 of the ICTY Rules confers broad discretionary power to the Chamber to "admit any relevant evidence which it
deems to have probative value." 2 13 And even though, the original Rule 71
206. IST Rules, supra note 10, R. 31, 68.
207. Memorandum from Anna M. Haughton, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law International War Crimes Research Lab, to the Office of the Prosecutor, The
Balancing of the Rights of the Accused Against the Rights of a Witness in Regard to
Anonymous Testimony, at 28 (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.law.case.edu/warcrimes-research-portal.
208. Patricia M. Wald, To "Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence": The Use of
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 535,
549 (2001).
209. Id.
210. ICTY Statute, supra note 188, art. 21(4)(c).
211. Id. art. 21(4)(e).
212. ICTY Rules, supra note 129, R. 90, reviewed by Wald, supra note 208, at 540.
213. ICTY Rules, supra note 129, R. 89(c).
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of the ICTY Rules, dealing with depositions, stated that witness depositions could only be used in "exceptional circumstances" at trial, 2 14 Rule
94ter was later added to the ICTY Rules to allow affidavits "'to prove a fact
in dispute where the affidavit, completed in accordance with the ICTY
Rules, corroborated the live [in-court] testimony of a witness. ' 2 15 Under
this rule, a witness was required to be present in court and be crossexamined only if the Trial Chamber sustained the opposing party's objection to the witness' affidavit. 2 16 In 1999, the ICTY amended the ICTY
Rules and removed the requirement that a Trial Chamber find "exceptional
circumstances" before it can order that a deposition instead of live in-court
2 17
witness testimony be used in court.

Today, Rule 94ter, allowing for the use of affidavits "to prove a fact in
dispute," no longer exists. It has been replaced by Rule 92bis, which allows
for the admission of affidavits in lieu of live in-court testimony if the testimony "goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of the
accused as charged in the indictment.' 2 18 However, as the case of Rule
94ter, Rule 92bis requires that a witness appear for cross-examination if the
Trial Chambers sustains the object of the opposing party over the witness'
affidavit. 2 19 This rule is the ICTY's attempt to reestablish the ICTY Rules'
original preference of live in-court witness testimony and the ability of the
other party to be able to cross-examine the witness.
Rule 92bis was prominent in Prosecutorv. Milosevic since the prosecutor sought to introduce the written statements of twenty-three witnesses
instead of their live in-court testimony. These written statements concerned events such as "attacks, killings and assaults in Kosovo, events that
constitute the widespread or systematic campaign of terror and violence
that the Prosecution charged the accused with having committed. ' 220 The
prosecution sought to introduce these statements to prove a "crime base,"
as the statements pertained to crimes committed in Kosovo but not to specific acts committed by Milogevit and thus under the ambit of the rule.
The Trial Chamber eventually allowed the written testimony with the right
of Milogevit to subsequently cross-examine the witnesses in court.
However, it was the Appeals Chamber, in Prosecutorv. Galic, that clarified the scope of Rule 92bis by stating that "where the evidence is so pivotal
to the Prosecution case, and where the person whose acts and conduct the
written statement describes is so proximate to the accused, the Trial Chamber may decide that it would not be fair to the accused to permit the evidence to be given in written form."' 22 1 However, the Appeals Chamber also
held that parties may use Rule 92bis to submit written testimony on the
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

ICTY Rules, supra note 129, R. 71, reviewed by Wald, supra note 208, at 540.
ICTY Rules, supra note 129, R. 94ter, reviewed by Wald, supra note 208, at 540.
Wald, supra note 208, at 540.
ICTY Rules, supra note 129, R. 71.
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Id. R. 92bis(E).
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acts and the conduct of others to establish the state of mind of the accused
with respect to the charges. 22 2 But more importantly, the Appeals Chamber's decision clarifying the scope of Rule 92bis has binding effect on all
Trial Chambers.
It is clear from the history of the tribunal's amendments of the provisions on written testimony that live in-court testimony, while preferred, is
not always required. Rule 92bis has been describe as having "a dramatic
impact on the way in which parties, and in particular the Prosecution, are
seeking to present their cases before the [ICTY]."223 While a literal interpretation of Rule 92bis only allows the admittance of written testimony
that does not address the acts and the conduct of others, commentators
maintain that the Appeals Chamber's binding decision can also allow the
introduction of written testimony as "background or peripheral
'2 24
evidence."
J. Judicial Notice
The Rules of Procedure, as well as the Iraqi Criminal Procedure of
Law, which supplements the Rules of Procedure, 2 25 do not address the
issue of judicial notice. However, taking into account the complexity of
war crimes trials and the time constraints on the IST, it is important for the
IST to address and resolve this issue. Furthermore, to do so, the IST
should examine the treatment of judicial notice by other war crimes tribunals and national courts in determining whether and, if so, how the IST
should take judicial notice of certain matters in the course of its
proceedings.
Judicial notice is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "[a] court's
acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party's
proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact."'2 26 For example, a court may
take judicial notice of the indisputable fact that "water freezes at 32
degrees Fahrenheit. '22 7 The purpose of judicial notice is to "promote expedience in trial proceedings and to prevent flagrant error." 228 This timesaving device is used in both common and civil law legal systems. 2 29 Judicially noticed facts are traditionally divided into two categories: adjudicative and legislative facts. An adjudicative fact is a fact that is "controlling or
operative ... rather than a background fact" 230 and a fact that "concern[s]
222. Id.
223. Gideon Boas, Developments in the Law of Procedure and Evidence at the Interna-

tional Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court,
12 CRIM. L.F. 167, 176 (2001).

224. Fairlie, supra note 220, at 78.
225. Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments, Number 23 of 1971,
Decree No. 230 Issued by the Revolutionary Command Council, Feb. 14, 1971, available
at http://www.iraqispecialtribunal.org/en/laws/LawOnCriminalProceedings.htm.
226. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 863-64 (8th ed. 2004).
227. Id. at 864.
228. Marea Beeman, Judicial Notice, May 2001, at 3, available at http://www.law.case.
edu/war-crimes-research-portal.
229. Id.
230. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 628.
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the immediate parties in a case: 'who did what, where, when, how and with
what motive or intent."' 23 1 Moreover, adjudicative facts may also be facts
that are generally known or easily verified such as calendar dates, 2 3 2 while
a legislative fact is a fact that "explains a particular law's rationality and
helps a court ... determine the law's content and application. '23 3 Additionally, legislative facts help to "determine the content of law and policy
and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of
action to take" and "generally transcend the interests of the immediate
23 4
parties."
Unlike the IST, the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence
address the issue of judicial notice. The ICTY and the ICTR have taken2 35a
"hybrid civil/common law approach toward admission of evidence.
The ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide that "[a]
Trial Chamber shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but
shall take judicial notice thereof."23 6 In addition, "[alt the request of a
party or proprio motu, a Trial Chamber, after hearing the parties may
decide to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts or documentary evidence
from other proceedings of the Tribunal relating to matters at issue in the
current proceedings. '23 7 By allowing judicial notice of adjudicated facts or
evidence from prior proceedings, the ICTY and ICTR are effectively
allowing affidavits to "'prove a fact in dispute' where the affidavit was 'in
corroboration of a live [in-court] witness's testimony[,] ''2 38 even though
prosecutorial attempts to introduce such affidavits pursuant to Rule 94 of
the ICTY Rules have been "repelled. ' 23 9 Also, the ICTY and ICTR Rules of
Evidence and Procedure do not distinguish between adjudicative or legislative facts, but they do require that these facts be part of common
2 40
knowledge.
The ICTY Trial Chamber, in Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, stated that
"by taking judicial notice of an adjudicated fact from another case, the Trial
Chamber proceeds from the assumption that the fact is accurate, that it
does not need to be re-established at trial but that, insofar as it is an
assumption, it may be challenged at trial."'2 41 In granting the defense
request for judicial notice, the Trial Chamber in Hadzihasanovic cited to the
Trial Chamber's conclusion in Krajisnik that for a fact to be admitted pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the ICTY Rules, the fact must have been "truly adjudicated in previous judgments" and fulfills the following criteria:
231. Beeman, supra note 228, at 5.
232. Id. at 6.
233. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 629.
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1. it is distinct, concrete and -identifiable;
2. it is restricted to factual findings and does not include legal
characterizations;
3. it was contested at trial and forms part of a judgment which has either
not been appealed or has been finally settled on appeal; or
4. it was contested at trial and now forms part of a judgment which is under
appeal, but falls within issues which are not in dispute on appeal;
5. it does not have a bearing on the criminal responsibility of the Accused;
6. it is not subject of (reasonable) dispute between the Parties in the present
case;
7. it is not based on plea agreements in previous cases; and
2 42
8. it does not negatively affect on the right of the Accused to a fair trial.
In addressing the issue of judicial notice, the IST should follow the
examples of judicial notice taken by the ICTY and the ICTR, but apply
judicial notice in a transparent manner so that all parties are satisfied that
the Tribunal is using judicial notice appropriately. 243 In addition, the IST
should notify the opposing party that it is taking judicial notice so that the
24 4
party is given the opportunity to dispute the use of judicial notice.
Finally, in deciding whether to take judicial notice, the IST should explicitly distinguish between adjudicative and legislative facts. For example,
"[a] previous decision taking judicial notice of a matter as a legislative fact
should generally not be authority for notice of the same matter as an adjudicative fact."'245 Judicial notice will help to expedite the IST proceedings
especially in light of the fact that many of the defendants are charged with
the same crimes. However, for judicial notice to be an effective procedural
tool, the IST has to ensure that its use of judicial notice is fair and the IST
must discourage abuse of the doctrine.
K.

Plea Bargaining

The ICTY Statute did not originally provide for plea bargaining and
the ICTY judges initially believed that plea bargaining was incompatible
with the objectives of international war crimes trials. 2 46 However, as its
trials have dragged on, the ICTY has come to incorporate plea bargaining
into its process as a procedural necessity in light of its heavy caseload and
"complex body of governing law." 24 7 For instance, in Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, the Appeals Chamber commented that plea bargains serve an
important purpose, taking into account the ICTY's complex and lengthy
242. Id.
243. See Beeman, supra note 228, at 2.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2-3.
246. Michael P. Scharf, TradingJusticefor Efficiency: Plea-Bargainingand International
Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CrIM. JUST. 1070 (2004).
247. Geoffrey R. Watson, The ChangingJurisprudence of the International Criminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 871, 883 (2003).
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proceedings and "stringent" budget concerns. 248
Moreover, in October 2003, the President of the ICTY, Theodor
Meron, expressed the ICTY's view on the value of plea agreements by
stating:
[W]ith properly detailed acknowledgement by defendants of their participation in the crimes for which they acknowledge guilt and genuine expressions
of remorse, plea agreements can play a constructive role. In some cases, a
forthright and specific acknowledgement of guilt may offer victims as much,
or even more, consolation2 49than would a conviction following repeated
protestations of innocence.
In addition, the ICTY's acceptance of a plea bargaining benefits the
ICTY, which has been charged with being impartial by some ethnic groups,
by legitimizing it. 2 5 0 A leading commentator on plea bargaining at the
ICTY, Nancy Amoury Combs, in her analysis of Biljana Plavsic's guilty
plea, states:
Admissions of guilt from high-level defendants confer ... not only practical

benefits, but reputational ones [and a]n admission of guilt proffered by a
defendant with such sterling nationalist credentials as the Serbian Iron Lady
[Biljana Plavsic] not only provides strong evidence to counteract the selfserving histories that still hold sway among Serbs, but also serves to legiti25
mize the institution that brought the criminal charges in the first place. '
And even though the ICTY's acceptance of plea bargaining is an overall positive development, 25 2 Nancy Amoury Combs cautions: "Institutions
like the ICTY can impair the very reconciliation they seek to advance if the
rewards that they hand out in appreciation for reconciliation become themselves an additional source of bitterness." 25 3 Consequently, former ICTY
President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald has recommended that the following
conditions should be present before a tribunal can accept a plea bargain:
1. [t]he complete indictment should be read aloud and a waiver of the reading should not be [permitted];
2. [t]he Prosecutor should be required to give [full] disclosure of the facts
that support the indictment;
3. [tlhe full plea agreement should be immediately released to the public and
if necessary, translated;
248. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Cl2 (Oct. 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
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4. [t]he Prosecutor should be required to present testimony from the victims,
similar to victim impact statements in the [United States]; and
5. [t]he sentence should reflect the seriousness of the crimes and the judges
should avoid any appearance
that they are bound [and cannot reject the
2 54
plea bargain agreements].
In the case of the IST Rules, Rules 57 and 58 address the issue of plea
bargaining. However, the IST can avoid the extensive need for plea bargaining if it creates a prosecutorial strategy, as mentioned above, that will limit
the number of defendants that the IST will prosecute. 255 But, if the IST
finds that plea bargains are a necessity, for example, to obtain critical witness testimony, the IST should be careful to ensure procedural transparency and be cognizant of the potential effects of plea bargaining on the
victims and the historic record. It is important in this regard that plea bargains establish a historical record of the events that transpired, and not
only those relating to a lesser charge. For this reason, bargaining of
' 2 56
sentences is "far less controversial than charge bargaining.

Conclusion
There is much the IST can learn both from the successes and missteps
of the ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL in their own attempts to gain credibility
and reach out to the people for whom they are serving by conducting these
trials. Many of the issues that will arise in the trials of Hussein and other
Ba'ath Party leaders have been tested in the real-world judicial laboratory of
the three ad hoc tribunals. For example, the right to self-representation
will likely be raised in the IST trials and the abundance of analysis in the
jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL will undoubtedly assist the IST
in its decision to either protect this right or curtail it in order to avoid
disruption and maintain the integrity of the proceedings. Moreover, the
IST is likely to face the tu quoque defense, which has had limited success in
international war crimes trials. Also, the debates and experiences of procedural devices for judicial efficiency, such as plea bargains and judicial
notice, adopted by the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL are likely to be helpful to the
IST. Also, procedural and evidentiary matters such as the requirement of
live in-court witness testimony and the protection of witnesses are issues
that the IST will encounter and which the experience of the other ad hoc
tribunals will likely be very useful in helping it solve these issues.
Although the IST Statute specifies that the IST Rules "shall be guided
by the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law,"' 25 7 the IST should also examine and
consider the case law of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL when the IST rules on
procedural matters. It will find that such a practice is as useful as its practice of relying on the case law of other international tribunals in interpret254.
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ing the crimes within its jurisdiction. 25 8 And to facilitate this process, the
major procedural rulings and judgments of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL
should be translated into Arabic without delay, so that they are accessible
to the IST.
In closing, I would like to share with you a profound question an Iraqi
judge once asked me. It occurred during one of the IST training sessions
in England, where the judges were discussing the application of ICTY case
law to the IST. One of the judges turned to me and asked: "Do you think in
ten years you might be sitting here with a group of judges from another
country talking about the application of the case law of the IST to their war
crimes tribunal?" Given that the IST judges were already thinking in terms
of their judicial legacy suggests that the answer is yes, the IST, too, will
undoubtedly make a significant contribution to the development of international humanitarian law.

258. See id. art. 17(b).

